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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the actions of the European Council during the 
Eurozone crisis through the lens of political constitutionalism. This 
analysis examines the role of political inputs in shaping EU constitutional 
developments, whether supranational or intergovernmental, to 
demonstrate the “legitimacy paradox” of new intergovernmentalism. That 
is, the European Council claimed the electoral legitimacy to rescue the 
Euro, but in doing so opened up new avenues for contesting EU 
legitimacy, notably in relation to national budgetary decision-making. For 
unlike with supranational constitutional agency, the European Council has 
the means to politicize its actions. However, the strategy taken during the 
sovereign debt crisis is shown to be one of depoliticization to prevent 
domestic contestation of EMU reform. At the same time, paradoxically, 
the politics of macro-economic policy has become Europeanized with the 
active participation of EU supranational actors. Since EMU reform is 
dependent on supranational enforcement of EMU rules, the new 
intergovernmentalism faces political contestation that previous, 
supranational EU constitutional development did not.  
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Introduction 
This article expands the discussion of constitutional practices in the EU 
treated in this special issue by applying the theoretical lens of political 
constitutionalism (Bellamy 2007; Goldoni 2012) to capture overlooked 
features of the EU’s legal-political development under the aegis of the 
European Council. The objective is to respond to what the editors of this 
special issue have termed the need for a ‘new political theory of the 
legitimacy of intergovernmental institutions’ (Fabbrini and Puetter, 
introductory article of this special issue). This imperative stems from the 
“integration paradox” identified by Puetter (2012), whereby ever closer 
union is being forged through intergovernmental action, not 
supranationalism. However, at the same time as the heads of State and 
Government have claimed the electoral legitimacy to rescue the Euro, the 
resulting reforms, I claim, are prone to engender more contestation and 
supranational politicization. This leads to a situation dubbed here as the 
“legitimacy paradox” of new intergovernmentalism.  
In analysing the causes and consequences of this legitimacy paradox it is 
important to recall the meaning of intergovernmentalism, which is 
premised on the existence of its antonym, supranationalism. These terms 
suggest a binary logic in the European integration process, a dichotomy 
that holds true, following Fabbrini (2013), for two constitutional logics: a 
supranational form (associated with supranational agents such as the 
CJEU or a constitutional convention) or an intergovernmental variant 
manifested by diplomatic wrangling over treaty change. Separating out 
constitutional logics in this manner captures the peculiar dynamics of EU 
integration since the Maastricht treaty (ibid.). As part of these 
developments, it is necessary to focus on how the EU’s particular brand 
of dual constitutionalism has evolved politically, beyond formal black-letter 
legal intricacies (Bellamy 2007). A political reading of constitutionalism 
regards constitutional rules and practices as the product of political actors 
participating in an on-going development; the actors involved (courts, 
elected officials, parties, and citizens), are constitutional agents taking 
part in constitutional agency (Goldoni and McCorkindale 2013).  
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Consequently, this article assesses the role of political inputs (elections, 
direct democracy, and popular mobilization) in shaping treaty-related 
constitutional developments that give rise to the legitimacy paradox. What 
matters for this analysis is not just the source of actors’ authority – national 
or EU-wide – but also the kind of political contestation that surrounds the 
constitutional evolution they set in motion. This framing of the political 
nature of constitutionalism thus requires an appreciation of the 
politicization surrounding constitutional agency within the EU, with 
politicization taken to mean making constitutional development a subject 
of public discussion and contestation (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). Such a 
move makes possible a comparison between the recent constitutional 
agency of the European Council and previous fundamental changes in the 
EU’s constitutional order. Hence the focus is on comparing the 
politicization of integration as it occurs across different forms of 
constitutional change; the paper does not address the wider phenomenon 
of how the EU is contested in national fora. 
This contrast, developed in section one, demonstrates that in the course 
of European integration there have been three types of constitutional 
agency relating to change in the content or interpretation of the treaties. 
Each involved varying degrees of politicization based on the institutional 
opportunity structure each type of agency offers for contesting the creation 
of EU constitutional rules and their enforcement. Supranational forms of 
constitutional agency via judicial intervention and the convention method 
respectively have involved low levels of politicization. In the case of the 
former this was structural and deliberate as courts are non-majoritarian 
institutions par excellence. The convention method was intended to allow 
for open and public debate, yet these ambitions never materialized. The 
third type is that of intergovernmental constitutional agency involving 
members of the European Council. In such instances the difference is that 
the European Council has certain political levers – activated by individual 
leaders or also collectively – to politicize or depoliticize constitutional rule-
making and enforcement.  
The argument then proceeds, in section two, by analyzing the political 
contestation surrounding the recent constitutional agency of the European 
Council. The intergovernmental solutions decided upon by the European 
Council to fix the sovereign debt crisis are shown to have been 
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accompanied by a strategy of depoliticization. That is, heads of state and 
government sought to prevent contestation that might delay overhauling 
EMU or put into question the nature of how bailout settlements are 
negotiated. In this way the new intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al. 
2014) is associated with a form of constitutional agency that, from a 
political constitutionalism perspective, is inherently contradictory. National 
leaders claim a democratic mandate to resolve EU crises in lieu of 
supranational agency, whilst at the same time stymying democratic 
contestation of emergency measures within and across member states.  
Section three shows how this legitimacy paradox is accompanied by 
increased political contestation of the Europeanized system of rule 
implementation concerning the macro-economic policy of Eurozone 
countries. Leaders and parties have little alternative except to challenge 
rule enforcement following fundamental, intergovernmentally negotiated 
and depoliticized rule change. The overall result is to show that the EU in 
its new intergovernmental phase still lacks a form of political 
constitutionalism that can legitimize constitutional agency – just as it did 
during the heyday of supranationalism. The key difference is that 
intergovernmental constitutional agency now faces the kind of 
contestation that previous, supranational EU constitutional development 
did not.  
Three Types of Constitutional Agency in European Integration 
In the course of the highly successful constitutionalization of European 
integration (Weiler, 1991; Stone Sweet, 2004) three types of constitutional 
agency can be identified. That is, the impetus for fundamental constitutive 
change can be traced to different actors and associated processes that 
have shaped the contours of EU competences and decision-making rules. 
The establishment of a constitutional-like structure has proceeded in one 
of three different ways: through judicial intervention, via special 
conventions, and diplomatically through inter-elite negotiation. It is within 
this context of different forms of constitutional agency that the contribution 
of the new intergovernmentalism exercised during the Eurozone crisis 
needs to be situated before its distinctiveness can be scrutinized properly. 
The contribution of the CJEU and national courts to integration through 
law is well-documented. It was the former’s jurisprudence in key cases 
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during the 1960s, accepted and even sought after by a range of national 
courts, that paved the way for a binding system of EU law in a way that 
the original EEC member states had not anticipated (Weiler 1991). These 
judicial interventions had long-lasting political repercussions, even if 
governments did not feel their effects immediately as the CJEU was 
strategic in confronting doctrinal questions using a long time horizon (Alter 
1998). More fundamentally, this revolutionary jurisprudence was 
articulated in a supranational manner beyond the gaze and the control of 
national political actors (or popular mobilization).  
Diplomatic negotiation is a more visible and immediate form of 
constitutional agency than abstruse legal reasoning. At various junctures 
in the process of “ever closer union” member states have sat down at an 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) to thrash out new treaties or to revise 
the existing ones. Such negotiations are complex, fraught affairs that 
invariably raise questions about national preference formation (Moravcsik 
1998). Hence this kind of diplomatic horse-trading can become highly 
politicized within national politics, particularly in subsequent ratification 
processes that are conducted according to diverse national practices 
including referendums. Indeed, there was an attempt to link the 2005 
Constitutional Treaty to a series of national ratification-by-referendum 
procedures but this project was derailed by the rejection of the treaty in 
popular votes held in France and the Netherlands. Thus it is impossible to 
speak of a standalone category of constitutional agency via direct 
democracy, unlike what happens in Switzerland where referendums can 
provide a vehicle for popular mobilization to contest and settle 
constitutional issues (Glencross 2014a).  
A third form of constitutional agency was attempted by means of specially 
constituted “conventions” designed to bring together a wider cast of 
stakeholders than would otherwise be present at an IGC. This “convention 
method” was used to draw up first a Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (1999-2000) and later to debate the future of Europe (2002-
03). The latter brought together European and national parliamentarians, 
government representatives, and other political actors to discuss 
constitutional arrangements suitable for a soon-to-expanded EU. 
According to one leading law scholar, the ‘undoubted attraction of the 
convention method lies in the way it broadens participation in the 
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constitutional conversation and thereby allows a public débat d’idées’ (de 
Witte, 2003: 215). Such an ambition points to the way that conventions 
were considered a more deliberative and transparent method of 
constitutional change than either of the other two forms of constitutional 
agency. As such, this method can certainly be considered more inherently 
supranational than diplomatic negotiation. For instance, the Convention 
on the Future of Europe consisted of 105 members, including 16 MEPs 
and  2 Commissioners alongside national parliamentarians and 
government representatives for each member state. (Of course, both the 
Charter and the Draft Constitutional Treaty required intergovernmental 
agreement to move into the realm of hard law.) 
 
Politicization and the Different Types of Constitutional Agency 
Having identified these three forms of constitutional agency it is now 
possible to contrast the political dynamics according to how far they 
establish a “political opportunity structure” for debating and contesting 
integration (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). Although the increase in EU 
authority is well known to have raised the saliency of integration within 
national politics (Hooghe and Marks 2009), political mobilization and 
contestation over this process has been deliberately muted (Mair 2007). 
This tendency of depoliticizing the construction of a European Union can 
be ascribed to elites’ willingness to set aside disputes over what form the 
nascent polity should eventually take in favour of creating a new venue for 
pursuing policy goals that would be less fettered by domestic 
constituencies (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
Nevertheless, there is a range of institutional and discursive opportunities 
available to politicize integration (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). These include 
national narratives employed to frame membership of the EU, media 
coverage, competitive party politics, and specific institutional moments 
such as referendums and crises in which the scope and level of EU 
integration come to the fore. What matters for present purposes though is 
how far different types of constitutional agency provide opportunities for 
the politicization of constitutive change within the EU. 
In its judicial guise, constitutional agency proceeds by disempowering 
national executives and parliaments in favour of an inter-linked national 
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and supranational legal superstructure (Alter 1998). Indeed, member 
states were blindsided by the Luxembourg’s court strategic use of the 
preliminary reference procedure to establish a new legal order as best 
illustrated perhaps by the 1988 Factortame case in the UK. More than two 
decades after the CJEU’s revolutionary jurisprudence, the British 
government was surprised that the House of Lords (acting then as 
Britain’s ultimate court of appeal) had the right to strike down legislation 
that infringed EEC law (MacCormick 1999). Equally important is the fact 
that integration through law has had a significant impact on policy-making 
via secondary legislation designed to make the four fundamental 
freedoms a reality. That is, the reliance on integration via the legal 
establishment of a pan-European single market, without corresponding 
social policy competences capable of counteracting inequalities, 
‘systematically weakens established socio-economic regimes at the 
national level, and it also generates a liberalizing bias in European 
legislation’ (Scharpf 2010: 243).  
These fundamental constitutive changes relating to rule creation and 
enforcement were wrought – albeit in a drawn-out fashion – by CJEU 
jurisprudence and took place largely in the absence of politicized debates, 
popular mobilization or electoral inputs. The agency of the CJEU is thus a 
classic instance of de-politicized, legal constitutionalism whereby 
competing rights or competence claims are adjudicated in a non-
majoritarian fashion (Bellamy 2007). It was in part as a reaction to this 
depoliticized constitutional evolution that a more open and deliberative 
model of constitutional agency was promoted by way of the “convention 
method” (Crum 2012).  
Conventions were called into being first to discuss individual rights and 
then to design a blueprint for an expanded and more democratic EU by 
producing a Draft Constitutional Treaty. This constitutional convention 
deliberately mimicked the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that produced 
the US federal constitution. The hope was to set in motion a politicized 
constitutional moment that would symbolize what the EU was and stood 
for, while at the same time tweaking its institutional makeup. The 
Convention was enacted in a top-down fashion by the European Council 
that met in Laeken in 2001, with the aim of establishing a body that would 
generate constitutional reflection in order to make the EU more 
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democratic, transparent and effective. The supranational membership of 
the Convention on the Future of EU, combined with its deliberative 
working methods, meant it drew on an “ontology of solidarism” in that its 
participants claimed to stand for a putative European people (Bellamy and 
Castiglione 2013). In this context, the power of national governments was 
deliberately set to one side, allowing the Praesidium to benefit greatly in 
terms of agenda-setting and the ability to supervise the drafting of treaty 
articles (Kassim 2004). 
Nevertheless, the final product of the Convention was picked apart at an 
IGC, where member states had the job of establishing a final treaty for 
signature and ratification. Indeed, even before the assembled 
representatives finalized their text intergovernmental power was in 
evidence as government representatives negotiated directly with the 
Praesidium. Perhaps most symbolically, United Kingdom Prime Minister 
Tony Blair met Convention President Giscard d’Estaing to emphasize the 
need to expunge the word “federalism” from any final document, a 
message that was not ignored (ibid.). Although revelatory about the 
dynamics of power, this anecdote about back-room deals also hints at the 
level of politicization the Convention method achieved: it was an elite-
driven affair that failed to connect with a mass public. Intended to 
contribute to a broad, pan-European public debate, this process for 
revising the treaties gave rise instead to inward-looking and self-
justificatory tendencies (Crum 2012).  
This disconnect with ordinary voters helps explain why the EU’s political 
elite was so startled by voters’ rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the 
Netherlands and France. National politicians were unprepared for the kind 
of politicization, which became entangled with tangential issues such as 
fear of service competition (the Polish plumber), Turkish accession, 
secularism, and abortion rights, that suddenly surrounded debates on the 
Constitutional Treaty in those countries (Maatsch 2007). Politicization 
took place domestically, therefore, but only after national publics were 
specifically called upon by certain governments to voice their opinion on 
the product of a supranational, deliberative process that had otherwise 
caused barely a ripple. Hence the convention method of constitutional 
agency follows an overtly political rather than legal logic, but only in a 
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hollowed-out fashion as conventions in their own right have failed to 
connect with mass politics.  
Finally it is necessary to examine the process of constitutional agency as 
driven by the European Council. As a diplomatic forum for redesigning EU 
institutions, both this body and the IGCs used to prepare treaty 
amendments that are infused with intergovernmental power in the shape 
of national veto points (Tsebelis 2008). However, the particularity of the 
European Council as a constitutional agent is that its members, 
individually and collectively, are able to shape (for better or for worse) the 
politicization of EU constitutional developments. This is because national 
governments can opt for treaty ratification by referendum as well as seek 
to avoid contesting rule changes and their actual implementation. 
For instance, when the Swedish government put membership of the euro 
to a referendum in 2003, voters’ rejection of joining the final stage of EMU 
meant that it obtained a de facto opt-out. However, the politicization 
strategy adopted by a single government may be national in design but 
can have pan-European effects. Most notably, the story of the pledges to 
hold referendums on the Constitutional Treaty is one of the contagion 
effect produced by Tony Blair’s decision to hold such a vote when 
confronted by domestic contestation (Gifford 2010). His idea was to 
channel EU-related politicization away from the forthcoming election in 
2005 so as not to affect his chances of returning to power. The result, 
however, was for a much broader political debate that saw a further seven 
countries promise to hold a referendum. 
At other times the European Council has sought to coordinate collectively 
across member states in order to control the way politicization takes place. 
EU leaders were notably active, for instance, in reminding Irish voters 
about the benefits of ever closer union in the two episodes in which the 
Irish government needed to re-run referendums in order to ratify both the 
Nice and Lisbon Treaties respectively (Hodson and Maher 2014). Indeed, 
the fact that no other country held a popular vote on the Lisbon Treaty 
testifies to the way national executives agreed not to politicize this treaty 
despites its close kinship to the doomed Constitutional Treaty (de Wilde 
and Zürn 2012). 
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Uniquely, therefore, the European Council has certain levers to politicize 
or depoliticize constitutional change. From a political constitutionalism 
perspective, this makes constitutional agency via executive discretion 
stand out from other forms of EU constitutional development. The 
European Council can – but not necessarily will – link constitutional 
evolution to partisan mobilization and public debate. Hence when it comes 
to evaluating the significance of “new intergovernmentalism” in the current 
dynamics of integration a focus purely on the European Council’s impact 
on the treaties is insufficient. There is an imperative to examine the 
European Council’s ability and willingness to depoliticize or not debates 
over constitutional development. Its handling of the sovereign debt crisis 
is a case study in point. 
Constitutional Agency and Depoliticization by the European Council 
during the Eurozone Crisis 
This section analyses how far the intergovernmental approach of the 
European Council in responding to the Eurozone crisis has involved 
politicization by this same body. Politicization matters for the normative 
dimension of political constitutionalism because political contestation 
(whether conducted through elected representatives or more directly by 
citizens themselves) is associated with the development of policy and 
even polity legitimacy (Glencross 2014a; Statham and Trenz 2013). 
Following de Wilde and Zürn (2012: 140) politicization in this context is 
defined as the process by which decisions and the institutional procedures 
behind decision-making become objects of political contestation. The 
ensuing public and participatory debate is a key step in legitimizing 
decision-making outcomes by virtue of being able to identify and mobilize 
some form of majority support.  
Hence the European Council’s ability to legitimize its own constitutional 
agency can be assessed by evaluating how explicitly this institution has 
wanted to subject its emergency decisions to political contestation i.e. 
politicization. The reality is that throughout the Eurozone crisis the 
European Council sought to de-politicize its constitutive decisions. In the 
period 2010-15 the European Council attempted in multiple contexts to 
depoliticize actions taken to fix the Eurozone crisis. That is, at the same 
time as heads of state and government took emergency measures, they 
sought to defuse political contestation surrounding their crisis 
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management. Their national electoral legitimacy provided an overweening 
justification for acting, but democratic political contestation was supposed 
to play a minimal role in the inter-governmental bargaining behind 
rescuing EMU. The depoliticization strategy is illustrated here by focusing 
on a number of instances in which the European Council took a direct 
interest in how the politics of public finances was conducted in certain 
member states. In particular, the European Council sought to circumscribe 
national debates so as to minimize the potential impact of politicization on 
emergency measures.  
The first such episode took place in the second half of 2011, when Greece 
was dicing with default and borrowing costs for financing Italian public 
borrowing began approaching unsustainable levels. The worry for the 
European Council was that contagion from Greece could lead to a debt-
management problem for the €2 trillion of Italian debt, which even the 
combined resources of the Eurozone would be hard-pressed to fix. So 
when the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou proposed to politicize 
domestically the new bailout package being proposed by the “troika” (the 
European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF), the European Council 
intervened.  
Papandreou’s idea – a response to rising discontent within his own party 
as well as amongst the Greek public over proposed austerity measures – 
was to hold a referendum on the new terms on offer. The announcement 
of a referendum came on 31 October; within a week Papandreou had 
resigned and the vote did not go ahead. This policy reversal was in large 
part due to pressure exercised by the Merkel-Sarkozy tandem claiming to 
speak for the EU, or at least the Eurozone. The Greek Prime Minister had 
been summoned to the G-20 summit in Cannes on 3-4 November, where 
both leaders sought to persuade him to abandon the referendum. 
Moreover, Papandreou stepped down in favour of a unity government, on 
the proviso that new elections would be delayed until after the new 
agreement with the Troika was ratified. The possibility for meaningful 
Greek domestic contestation of the bailout terms were thus snuffed out as 
far as possible, the intention being to put in place as quickly as possible 
measures that would ease market jitters.  
In Italy at that same time the situation was different because Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi was both in a stronger position internally and 
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not facing the external intervention of the Troika. Nevertheless, Italy’s 
borrowing costs increased dramatically over the course of 2011, creating 
a vicious circle of higher interest payments and rising total debt as a 
percentage of GDP (Lane 2012). EU leaders were particularly concerned 
about lacking the means to bail out Italy should the country fail to raise 
debt from private creditors. It was in this context that the Sarkozy-Merkel 
duo lost faith in Berlusconi’s ability to oversee budgetary rigour sufficient 
to reduce short-term borrowing costs. At a meeting of the European 
Council in Brussels on 23 October the French and German leaders had 
already requested revised budgetary proposals from Berlusconi that 
subsequently failed to convince. This vincolo esterno proved decisive in 
helping Italian President Giorgio Napolitano to orchestrate the 
appointment of a technocratic government under the premiership of Mario 
Monti (Anderson 2014). In doing so, Napolitano ensured that Italian party 
politics did not jeopardise the European Council’s plans to rescue EMU. 
These efforts converged in late 2011 around the idea of creating a new 
treaty mandating enhanced fiscal discipline well beyond the terms of the 
(already revised and more stringent) Stability and Growth Pact. The key 
measure was the introduction of national balanced budget rules in order 
to appease the sentiment in creditor countries that EU bailouts were 
funding a legacy of public largesse (Glencross 2014a). In keeping with the 
depoliticization agenda of the preceding months, the European Council, 
under the aegis of the German government, sought to avoid political 
contestation of fundamental EMU reform. To this end Angela Merkel was 
happy for the Fiscal Compact to proceed as an inter-governmental treaty 
– thereby side-stepping David Cameron’s attempt to link favourable 
concessions to the UK with EU treaty reform (Beach, 2013: 118).  
Indeed, the treaty itself was designed to limit politicization of its ratification 
as it did not require unanimity as a condition of entry into force; it became 
legally binding when 12 Eurozone countries ratified it, thereby preventing 
last-minute ratification delays in obstreperous parliaments. In Ireland, the 
only country that held a referendum on the treaty, depoliticization was 
evident as the major opposition party supported the government 
campaign for a yes vote (Hodson and Maher 2014). The Fiscal Compact 
itself was thus another instance of the depoliticized and intergovernmental 
approach to reforming EMU in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis.  
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But it was in 2015, during the second act of the Greek referendum drama, 
that the European Council’s depoliticization strategy was most evidently 
laid bare when the new Syriza government organized the referendum on 
bailout conditionality that Papandreou had only threatened. This attempt 
to politicize EMU crisis-management meant breaking ranks with their 
Eurozone counterparts and openly challenging the dominant technocratic, 
consensus-based approach adopted since the start of the crisis. 
Ultimately, the price paid for seeking a political deal that did not conform 
with the negotiation instructions coming from the troika institutions was 
exclusion. Yanis Varoufakis, the then Greek Finance Minister, was 
uninvited from a meeting of the “informal” Eurogroup on 27 June 2015 that 
discussed the impending end of the previous bailout agreement.  
Having tried to politicize from within the EU’s inter-governmental fora, the 
Greek government then resorted to direct democracy at the national level. 
This was not just an appeal for a popular mandate from the Greek people, 
but was also designed to put debt relief in the public spotlight and engage 
with anti-austerity politics bubbling away under the surface across Europe. 
This strategy is consistent with horizontal Europeanization at the 
grassroots, but the European Council itself was unimpressed and refused 
to countenance any deal that side-stepped the technical input of the ECB. 
Consequently, heads of state and government tried to stay aloof from the 
transnational debate the Greek referendum engendered and refused to 
acknowledge that a national political mandate could change the 
negotiation process. 
By contrast it was supranational actors, otherwise deprived of a political 
say in the actual bailout negotiations discussed in the European Council, 
who entered the fray most publicly. Having already immersed himself in 
the bailout negotiations with the Greek Prime Minister, Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker made the most dramatic intervention of 
the referendum campaign with his controversial warning to the Greek 
people “that you shouldn’t choose suicide just because you are afraid of 
death”. Similarly, Martin Schulz, the President of the European Parliament 
openly expressed his annoyance at Greece’s attitude during negotiations. 
The actions of these supranational actors points to the fact that the new 
legal-political architecture established by the constitutional agency of the 
European Council cannot do away with political contestation. As de Wilde 
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and Zürn (2012: 150) observe, ‘the financial crisis forces the issue of 
European integration onto the political agenda’. 
The Legitimacy Paradox and the Inescapable Politicization of the 
Eurozone’s Economic Order  
It is precisely the European Council’s emphasis on de-politicization that 
has created the legitimacy paradox. That is, while elected heads of state 
and government draw on their electoral legitimacy to act and reshape 
EMU, they simultaneously seek to bypass public debate when considered 
essential for swift resolution. Moreover, this legitimacy paradox is 
compounded by the European Council’s enduring need to draw on the 
support of supranational actors, who themselves are increasingly at the 
forefront of politicizing EMU reform. The result is an uneasy tension that 
is liable to increase because the constitutive changes wrought by the 
European Council are as much about rule implementation – requiring 
supranational inputs – as rule change. In this sense, notwithstanding 
attempts at depoliticizing rule change, the new intergovernmentalism will 
contribute to the heightened politicization of integration. 
This tension is bound to be particularly acute in the future application of 
the rules contained in the so-called Fiscal Compact and in the new 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. The feature of the new legal-political 
architecture that stands out as singularly problematic for the politicization 
that it will ineluctably generate is the move to a “structural deficit” criterion 
for both the re-vamped Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Fiscal 
Compact. This technical-sounding change means that the deficit for each 
Eurozone country will now be measured by virtue of ‘discounting the 
positive or negative effect that the position on the economic cycle has on 
the accounts of the exchequer’ (Menéndez, 2014: 136). Defining what is 
the current economic cycle (e.g. global recession) is not the only problem 
as identifying the actual position on a given cycle – which will need to take 
into account policy measures such as structural reforms designed to 
enhance future growth – is also necessary. Hence the very concept of a 
structural deficit can be considered fundamentally indeterminate (ibid., p. 
137). 
The indeterminacy of the key metric for enforcing the SGP and the 
balanced budget provisions of the Fiscal Compact are symptomatic of the 
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European Council’s reliance on rule-based enforcement. Yet by opting for 
such a seemingly neutral, technocratic procedure – rather than on an 
alternative such as market discipline (Kelemen and Teo 2014) – the new 
intergovernmentalism brings politics back in by the back door. For only a 
political decision can settle the intense definitional debate regarding the 
application of criteria that distinguish headline deficits from structural 
ones.  
Resolving this ambiguity, a precondition for identifying compliance and 
sanctioning non-compliant member states, will from the outset not even 
be a straightforward inter-governmental affair. Since the European 
Commission is charged with undertaking an annual review of national 
fiscal practices it will have to have its say on where each country lies in 
the supposed economic cycle. Similarly, it is up to the Commission to 
generate policy recommendations for countries subject to an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure under the SGP (and even those, namely Germany, 
running an excess current account surplus), and submit these to the 
Council and the European Parliament. Hence defining the actual kind of 
deficit any individual Eurozone country has is bound to be an inherently 
inter-institutional affair within the EU.  
Indeed, this definitional debate is already in full inter-governmental and 
supranational swing, demonstrating the complex, politicized nature of this 
specific, ostensibly technical policy detail. François Hollande contested, 
and won, the French Presidential election in 2012 on a platform 
advocating a “growth pact” to edulcorate the Fiscal Compact negotiated 
by his opponent Nicolas Sarkozy. This pledge subsequently gave rise to 
a European Council summit agreement on 29 June 2012 to launch a 
“Compact for Growth and Jobs” worth €100 billion, albeit thanks to some 
creative accounting.  
The French example of politicizing stimulus policies in the face of austerity 
is part of a nascent EU-pattern that is itself a response to the legitimacy 
paradox engendered by the European Council’s recent constitutional 
agency. It has already been noted that the institutional response to the 
Eurozone crisis sparked an unprecedented and sustained level of 
mobilization around EU issues (Statham and Trenz 2013). What is 
apparent when viewed through the lens of political constitutionalism is that 
politicizing rule enforcement is the only means left to contest the fait 
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accompli of constitutive changes brought about via the new 
intergovernmentalism. 
More specifically, party leaders and their parties that support Keynesian 
demand-management chafe at the new economic order of the Eurozone, 
which is founded on balanced budgets that depend on reducing 
discretionary (i.e. politically-motivated) spending. This is the context in 
which the Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, weighed in after his 
nomination in 2014. He challenged the budgetary principles of the SGP 
and the Fiscal Compact by proposing to exclude investment and 
educational expenditure from public deficit calculations. His argument that 
such spending boosts growth in the long run, thereby helping to reduce 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, was a deliberate attempt to politicize the new rules 
governing EMU. Renzi chose to politicize the issue collectively by 
associating with Hollande to convene a meeting of eight socialist heads 
of state in Paris just prior to the June European Council summit. Similarly, 
the French President for his part sought to exclude costs associated with 
the government’s signature reform plan – a “responsibility pact” of 
corporate tax breaks designed to boost employment – from figures 
counting towards the SGP. What these left-of-centre leaders are engaging 
in, then, is the contestation, on the basis of their national democratic 
legitimacy, of rule enforcement after the fact of fundamental, 
intergovernmentally-negotiated and depoliticized rule change.  
A further demonstration of the inescapable politicization of the new 
constitutional arrangements is the participation of supranational actors – 
just as with the bailout deals – in actually contesting the application of the 
new macro- economic rules. One of Jean-Claude Juncker’s first acts as 
newly-selected President of the European Commission was to promise a 
change in the Eurozone bailout mechanism so that financial assistance 
can be provided on the basis of a social impact assessment alongside the 
existing fiscal sustainability one. In the wake of the migration crisis, the 
European Commission has indicated a willingness to accept flexibility 
when monitoring EMU budgetary rules to account for the financial impact 
of refugee numbers. This proposal comes in the wake of the leniency 
already afforded France when it comes to the timetable for meeting the 
EMU rules on annual budget deficits.  
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Consequently, it appears that ostensibly depoliticized constitutional 
developments in the crucial sphere of macro-economic policy are by no 
means capable of eradicating political contestation and of excluding the 
participation of supranational actors. It was above all the formal entry into 
force of these measures that was stage-managed to remove potential 
opposition from within certain countries, thereby appeasing the markets 
and the ECB alike (Glencross 2014b). This depoliticization of rule-making 
is in line with a core assumption of deliberative inter-governmentalism, 
which states that deliberative processes are a means of insulation from 
the pressures of the two-level game that usually operates in EU policy 
debates (Puetter 2012). Yet when it comes to the application of these new 
rules, politicization and supranational involvement are an inevitable 
consequence of an ever more Europeanized system of budgetary 
supervision (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013).  
Conclusions 
This article examined the actions and ramifications of the European 
Council’s response to the crisis in EMU governance. The aim was, 
following the theoretical framework of political constitutionalism, to explore 
the political dimension of constitutional change. To this end, the article 
compared the level of political contestation, or politicization, of 
fundamental changes in the content or interpretation of the treaties, and 
whether this proceeded by supranational or intergovernmental means. 
What this comparison demonstrated is that supranational forms of 
constitutional agency – via judicial intervention or through the convention 
method – have not offered much by way of institutional opportunities for 
politicizing integration. By contrast with CJEU jurisprudence or debates in 
a specially convened constitutional convention, the European Council has 
at its disposal levers to depoliticize, or not, its own brand of constitutional 
agency. Most notably, certain heads of government sought to politicize 
the Constitutional Treaty in their own fashion by calling referendums, with 
subsequent contagion effects elsewhere. Conversely, a collective 
agreement was reached to prevent such uncontrolled politicization when 
it came to the subsequent Lisbon Treaty. 
The solutions decided upon by the European Council to fix the sovereign 
debt crisis were accompanied by a strategy of depoliticization to prevent 
any domestic contestation that might delay the overhauling of EMU. As 
19 
 
successful as this intergovernmental strategy was initially, the election of 
the Syriza government in Greece highlighted the underlying tension 
surrounding the intergovernmental consensus espoused by the European 
Council. The willingness of supranational actors to participate in the 
ensuing political clashes over rule implementation is taken to be 
symptomatic of how the new intergovernmentalism has Europeanized the 
politics of macro-economic policy and offers new opportunities for 
supranational inputs (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). Moreover, the 
eventual application of the rules covering member states’ structural 
deficits, combined with nascent debates over how to finance the refugee 
crisis reveal the impossibility of depoliticizing budgetary politics. Indeed, if 
the Five Presidents’ report, which mooted a common Eurozone treasury, 
is anything to go by, the next phase of EU constitutional development will 
coincide with a direct clash over the economic principles of EMU 
(European Commission 2015).  
Ultimately, reading recent EU developments through the lens of political 
constitutionalism, reveals a paradox behind the constitutional agency of 
the European Council. Heads of state and government claimed to have 
the legitimacy to fix EMU and relegate supranational actors to a secondary 
role. At the same time, however, the European Council sought to dampen 
down contestation over the constitutionalization of ordo-liberalism. But 
politicization happened regardless, as shown by contestation in national 
political arenas (notably in Greece) and by the active participation of 
supranational actors in debating bailouts. Yet the new economic order 
established during the Eurozone crisis depends on both the stability of 
national policy preferences and the supranational enforcement of EMU 
rules. Hence all the indications are that the new intergovernmentalism will 
face political contestation in a way that previous, supranational EU 
constitutional development did not.  
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